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The objective of this working paper is to highlight the major issues facing sugar industries in SADC.  This is 
achieved within a framework that recognises the existence of distortions in global sugar markets.  To this 
end, a conceptual framework whose central pillar is the existence of market distortions is presented.  It is 
followed by a description of the characteristics of the SADC sugar industries and the kind of distortions 
that they face in the real world.  The main features of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement as well as 
a consolidated list of key issues facing the SADC sugar industries is presented.   
The paper finds firstly that there is a strong case for special sugar trading arrangements. Secondly, mutual 
benefits can be generated from cooperation in accessing foreign markets. Thirdly, high exposure to world 
markets will improve market access within SADC.  Finally, the paper brings together issues facing the 
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Of the twelve countries that are signatories to the Protocol on Trade in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), nine of them are involved in the growing and milling of 
sugarcane (hereafter referred to as the sugar industry).  In each country, the sugarcane growing 
and milling activities play an important socio-economic role.  At the same time, there are severe 
distortions existing within individual SADC sugar markets as well as global sugar markets.  We 
shall refer to these distortions (which have different implications for the various SADC sugar 
industries) as internal and external, respectively. 
The objective of this paper is to use the internal and external distortions as a backdrop for 
highlighting the key issues facing SADC sugar industries.  To this end, a conceptual framework 
whose central pillar is the existence of market distortions will be presented.  This will be done in 
Section 2 of this paper.  It will be followed in Section 3 by a description of the characteristics of 
the SADC sugar industries and the kind of distortions that they face in the real world.  Section 4 
presents the main features of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement (appearing as Annex VII 
of the SADC Protocol on Trade), which is a response to, among other things, existing distortions.  
Section 5 presents a consolidated list of key issues facing the SADC sugar industries in the light of 
the analysis in the previous three sections.  Finally, Section 5 will summarise, in broad terms, the 
major conclusions of the paper. 
2. Conceptual Framework  
The SADC Protocol on Trade provides for the free movement of goods and services.  Exempted 
from this free movement provision are “sensitive products” which were selected on account of 
their strategic importance, peculiar characteristics or high profile in the economies of the 
countries concerned.  Sugar is one of these sensitive products.  The question is how should the 
movement of sugar be determined in light of its sensitive nature without ignoring the principles of 
efficiency and equity?  It is in the process of answering this question that the key issues facing 
sugar industries in SADC will emerge. 
The categorisation of sugar as a sensitive product can be rationalised on the basis of three 
major considerations.  The first is the existence of severe distortions in the form of tariff and non-
tariff barriers surrounding various markets in the different regions of the world.  The end result of 
these distortions is that sugar trade is not governed by price signals generated by the interaction 
of the normal forces of supply and demand.  Under such conditions, a country may be highly 
cost-competitive, but would not be able to access high-cost countries because of barriers to 
trade.  In the extreme case, an efficient sugar industry may end up being driven out of production 
by an inefficient one that happens to be either well protected or well supported by its 
government. 
The second consideration is that sugar is a political commodity.  At a basic level, people need 
something sweet to make food palatable (a basic needs commodity); otherwise there would be a 
lot to complain about, ultimately casting the government of the day in a poor light.  At a higher 
level, sugar features prominently in the policy-making of all the SADC countries – irrespective of 
stage of development.  Even the most advanced country in the region (namely, South Africa), is 
on record as having stated that it will not fold its arms and allow its sugar industry to be driven to 
the ground by cheaper sugar imports from neighbouring countries.  Some SADC countries have 
embarked on dam projects and the rehabilitation of old sugar mills with the active support of 
their respective governments.  Examples in this connection are Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Tanzania. 
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The third consideration is that all the sugar industries in SADC play crucial strategic roles in their 
respective economies.  For instance, they promote economic growth through contributions to 
national output, foreign exchange earnings and government revenues out of which social services 
are provided.  They promote economic diversification through forward and backward linkages 
with other sectors (such as machinery, fertilizer, transportation, beverages, sweets, pre-packing, 
wholesale and retail).  They promote human development through incomes generated from both 
direct and indirect employment (including the informal sector which can be quite vibrant); 
provision of social services (such as education, health, housing, water and recreation); 
participation of smallholder growers; and outsourcing of certain services (such as rations, 
painting, maintenance and garbage collection). 
It can be appreciated from all the above considerations that sugar is indeed a special 
commodity, which requires special trading rules.  In the long run, the best scenario is one where 
the distortions have been removed and trade is based on comparative advantage.  This would be 
a first-best world.  However, owing to the fact that we are in a second-best world, special rules to 
govern the trade of the sensitive product sugar are required before this can occur. It is the 
theoretical underpinnings of these rules that will be presented in this section of the paper.  The 
approach will be general equilibrium in the sense of incorporating interactions among different 
sectors. 
Suppose that the economy can be sub-divided into three sectors.  Sectors 1 and 2 are 
producing closely substitutable commodities.  Sector 2 has a distortion revealing itself in price 
being below the marginal cost of production (that is, there is a production subsidy).  Sector 1 is 
the controlled sector where a decision is to be made on pricing.  Should the price be set above 
or below marginal cost of production?  If price is not equated to marginal cost, then a distortion 
shall have been introduced into the controlled sector.  Sector 3 produces a composite 
commodity where price equals marginal cost (that is, there is no distortion). 
To answer the question of where the price should be set in Sector 1, we make use of three 
diagrams corresponding to the three sectors.  In each diagram, the vertical axis measures money 
value and the horizontal axis measures output in quantity terms.  For analytical convenience, it 
has been assumed that the supply schedules are infinitely elastic in all sectors. 
Suppose that the distortion in Sector 2 is in the form of a subsidy equal to P2P3 per unit.  The 
supply schedule without the subsidy is S2 whereas the supply schedule with the subsidy is S3.  
Given the initial demand of D2, the producer in Sector 2 will settle at point i where the output is 
Q4.  The socially optimal level of output is Q3 (corresponding to the intersection of D2 and S2).  
There are too many resources devoted to Sector 2 than are socially optimal.  The result is a net 
social loss equal to fig.  It is the difference between the resource cost of fQ3Q4g and consumer 
surplus of fQ3Q4i.  This is the welfare loss that needs to be eliminated. 
In Sector 1, let the initial supply schedule be S0 and the demand schedule be D.  The 
intersection of these two schedules occurs at a; giving rise to output level Q0.  The question then 
is at what level should price be set in the controlled sector.  Should it be equal to P0 or not?  To 
answer this question, let us observe what would happen if price were lowered below P0.  
Specifically, let the price fall to P1 through a subsidy equal to P0P1 per unit of output.  The new 
intersection point at c gives rise to an additional resource cost of aQ0Q1d and additional 
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Figure 3: Sector 3 
In the meantime, the fall in the Sector 1 price has brought about an inward shift of the demand 
curve in Sector 2 from D2 to D3.  This occurs because the products of these two sectors are 
assumed to be substitutes.  The demand schedule must shift inwards until the point of 
intersection with S3 is directly below f.  This is on account of the fact that the socially optimal level 
of output is Q3.  The resource saving associated with the contraction of output is fQ3Q4g and the 
consumer surplus loss is fQ3Q4i.  Thus, there is a net saving equal to fig.  This is the very amount 
that was a social welfare loss initially and needed to be eliminated.  Hence the mission has been 
accomplished. 
At the new intersection point of h, there is a net loss equal to ehf.  This is on account of the fact 
that from a social viewpoint, the resource cost is eQ2Q3f whereas the consumer surplus is 
eQ2Q3h.  Social welfare will be maximised if this loss as well that in Sector 1 (namely acd) are 
eliminated.  This will be achieved through fiscal transfers from Sector 3.  Assuming that the 
products of Sectors 1 and 3 are complements, then D4 will shift outward to D5 (in the wake of the 
fall in the price of the Sector 1 product).  The complementarity assumption is reasonable on 
account of the positive linkages between the sugar industry and various other sectors.  The new 
intersection occurs at k. 
Let the subsidy for Sector 1 be financed by a tax levied on Sector 3.  This will bring about a shift 
of the supply schedule from S4 to S5.  The intersection point l has been deliberately chosen to be 
directly above j so that there is no permanent net movement of resources into Sector 3.  The 
output level corresponding to intersection point l is Q5.  The movement from k to l has resulted in 
a loss of consumer surplus equal to ljk.  For net social welfare to be maximized, the revenue of 
P5P4jl must be equal to ljk in Sector 3 plus ehf in Sector 2 plus acd in Sector 1. 
There are two general conclusions emanating from the above diagrammatic analysis.  First, 
price should not be set equal to marginal cost in Sector 1 if there is a distortion in Sector 2.  In 
other words, a distortion should be deliberately introduced into Sector 1 for purposes of 
counteracting an existing distortion in Sector 2.  Second, social welfare will be maximized if the 
sum of the consequential welfare losses is set equal to the fiscal transfers from Sector 3. 
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Let us now extend the first conclusion into the sugar world.  We shall do so at two levels – 
namely, regional (one country versus other countries in SADC) and global (SADC region versus 
other economic blocs).  At the regional level, the sugar industries in the different countries are 
subject to various forms of distortions.  In the context of the second-best framework presented 
above, a given SADC country would be advised against opening up its borders to allow free trade 
in sugar.  Net social welfare within SADC can only be maximised if there are special rules 
introduced to govern sugar trade. 
At the global level, SADC has to decide whether or not to open up its borders collectively to 
other regions of the world.  To the extent that these other regions are subject to various forms of 
distortions themselves, SADC would be advised against opening up its borders freely.  It is not 
surprising in this connection that other economic blocs around the world exclude sugar from the 
normal free flow of trade.  This is the case under the North American Free Trade Area (where 
sugar flows are governed by a side letter), European Union (where there is a sugar regime 
forming part of the common agricultural policy), Andean Pact and Mercosur. 
The case for liberalised global trade is based on higher global income associated with 
comparative advantage.  At some future point in time, sugar trade would also have to be 
liberalised.  However, the liberalisation should be a gradual process rather than an abrupt event 
that takes place overnight.  The economies concerned should be allowed adequate time to adjust 
in an orderly fashion to the new dispensation.  This is particularly important in light of the fact that 
sugar is a political commodity which has historically featured prominently in national policy-
making in both developing and developed countries.  It also makes good sense from an efficiency 
viewpoint to the extent that it allows the relevant information for decision-making purposes to 
permeate throughout all the relevant sectors of the economy. 
The second conclusion from the diagrammatic analysis can be generalised into the need for 
support of the sugar industry through fiscal transfers from the rest of the economy.  This can 
come in different forms – such as improved infrastructure, subsidised credit for smallholder 
growers and tax credits for rebates given by the sugar industry to enterprises that add value to 
sugar locally.  Whilst this is seemingly against the drive by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
to, among other reforms, reduce domestic support measures; it can be accommodated under the 
special and differential treatment allowed for developing countries.  SADC is indeed a developing 
region. 
The three-sector diagrammatic analysis presented above can be augmented by a consideration 
of its implications for both internal and external terms of trade (ToT).  The former refers to the unit 
price of sugar relative to that of other domestically produced agricultural products whereas the 
latter refers to the unit price of exports relative to that of imports.  Let Ps and Pz represent the 
prices of sugar and a composite agricultural product, respectively.  The effect of excluding sugar 
from free trade is to raise Ps relative to Pz.  In other words, the domestic ToT will move in favour 
of the sugar sector.  Other things being equal, resources will move from other agricultural sectors 
into the sugar sector.  This will raise social welfare only if the net benefits from increased activity 
in the sugar sector exceed the net loss from reduced activity elsewhere in the agricultural sector.  
Whilst this is an empirical question,  considerations indicate that social welfare will indeed 
be higher after the improvement of the domestic ToT for sugar.  This stems from the fact that 
sugar was specified as a sensitive product using a set of criteria that were applicable to all other 
products in all the SADC countries.  The underlying principle of these criteria is the pervasive 
influence in the economy.  Thus, the movement of the domestic ToT in favour of the sugar sector 
is expected to enhance overall welfare. 
From the higher output in the sugar sector, higher incomes are expected out of which will flow 
higher tax revenues.  This raises the ability of government to provide a better enabling 
environment for even higher investment, production, employment and incomes in the economy.  




It could, for instance, increase the quantity of economic and social infrastructure as well as 
provide tax concessions for the sugar sector to indirectly encourage higher investment and 
employment elsewhere in the economy via special rebates extended to industrial users of sugar 
(small and large). 
Turning to external ToT, let Px and Pm represent unit prices of exports and imports, respectively.  
Px will incorporate the price receivable from sugar exports to preferential markets.  Because of the 
distortions already alluded to, Px will be higher than would have been the case if all sugar exports 
went to the world sugar market.  To the extent that all of the surplus sugar producers in SADC 
(that is, countries whose domestic production exceeds domestic consumption) have access to 
preferential markets (albeit to varying degrees), then Px is higher than would have been the case 
otherwise for all of them.  As long as barriers to sugar trade exist, Pm will remain constant both 
before and after the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement.  This means that external ToT in the 
SADC region will be determined by Px.  Thus, for all SADC surplus sugar producers, external ToT 
will be higher than would have been the case otherwise.  This represents an opportunity for the 
sugar producers to rise to higher stages of development.  This is equitable to the extent that 
SADC is a less developed region.  It is also efficient to the extent that it promotes market 
discipline and integrates SADC into the global economy. 
Within SADC itself, there will be a differential impact among the countries involved.  For the 
SACU sugar producers, the external ToT will deteriorate because for each ton of sugar coming in 
under the non-reciprocal arrangements, they have to sell a ton in the world market whose price is 
much lower than the SACU price.  For the non-SACU SADC sugar producers, the external ToT 
will improve because they will be diverting sugar from the lower-price world market to the higher-
price SACU market.  This will essentially transfer income from SACU to the rest of SADC.  This 
can only be equitable if SACU has an overall trade surplus towards the rest of SADC; otherwise 
not.  This point will not be developed any further because it is outside the scope of this paper. 
In conclusion then, we can say that because of the existing distortions facing the different sugar 
industries in both SADC and further afield, there is a case for special sugar trading rules.  This case 
is built on the second-best theory.  Until distortions in the rest of the sugar world are eliminated 
(or at least substantially reduced), it would not be in the long-term interests of the SADC sugar 
industries to engage in free sugar trade.  If there were to be free sugar trade in the currently 
distorted world, a few countries may benefit in the short run.  But in the long run, overall social 
welfare in SADC would be lower than would be the case otherwise.  Finally, there will be 
movements in internal and external ToT.  These movements provide an opportunity for 
government intervention to take national economies to higher stages of development. 
3. Sugar Industries in SADC 
In this section we describe the SADC sugar industries using selected indices (some quantitative, 
others qualitative) and also highlight the kind of distortions which they face.  We start with the 
Table 1 showing production, consumption and trade. 
Three are three observations to be highlighted from the Table 1.  First, from an aggregate 
viewpoint, SADC is a net surplus producer (that is, production exceeds consumption).  Second, 
SADC is a net sugar exporter (that is, exports exceed imports).  Third, South Africa is the largest 
producer, consumer and exporter; followed by Mauritius; then Zimbabwe and Swaziland.  The 
rest of the countries produce less than 210 000 tons per annum. 
Table 2 ranks selected countries from SADC and rest of the world by unit production costs. 
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Table 1: Sugar Production, Consumption and Trade for SADC Countries (Raw Value; 
1998) 
Country Production   Consumption      Exports    Imports  
       (Tons)       (Tons)       (Tons)      (Tons) 
Angola         32 000         85 000               0    7 025 
Malawi                209 703                   158 161       67 224  16 469 
Mauritius      666 841         42 683     638 694  41 434 
Mozambique        38 555       121 125       20 286  98 307 
South Africa   2 984 892    1 366 806  1 087 088          0 
Swaziland      537 096         27 550     256 527          0 
Tanzania      110 200       200 000       22 121 128 807 
Zambia                 172 600         74 800       86 800     2 564 
Zimbabwe      571 943       305 325     242 641         11 
Total               5 323 830    2 603 400  2 421 381 294 617 
Sources: Sugar Yearbook 1999 published by the International Sugar Organisation, London and Swaziland Sugar 
Association for consumption in Swaziland. 
 
Table 2: Raw Sugar Production Cost, Exports and Export Ratio for Selected Countries 
Rank  Country   Cost per Exports Export 
      Ton  (1998)  Ratio 
      (1997-92)    (1998) 
(US $)  (Tons)      (%)  
1  Guatemala   234  1 371 186    81,5 
2  Zimbabwe   235     242 641    42,4 
3  Swaziland   250     256 527    47,8 
4 Thailand   251  2 443 777    59,0 
5 Colombia   256     773 778    36,4 
6  Brazil    258  8 675 148    45,3 
7  Fiji    271     243 282    87,6 
8  Australia   273  4 691 495    92,3 
9  South Africa   294  1 087 088    36,4 
10  India    303       85 774      0,6 
11  Mauritius   314     638 694    95,8 
12  Philippines   320     188 119    12,2 
13  Cuba    338  2 568 580    78,0 
14  El Salvador   348     255 345    52,5 
15  Dominican Republic  349     260 082    50,4 
16  Argentina   371     227 683    13,0 
17  China    485     459 138      5,2 
18  Turkey    485     303 507    10,9 
19  Poland    563     369 409    16,9 
20  European Union  570  6 357 196    35,4 
Note: Export ratio is defined as exports divided by production (and then converted into percentages).  
Sources: LMC International (for cost per ton) and Sugar Yearbook 1998 published by the International Sugar 
Organisation, London (for exports and production). 
Table 2 lists a sample of only 20 countries out of a total of 121 sugar-producing countries in the 
world.  There are two observations to highlight from this table.  First, the four SADC countries 
included in the sample are in the top 55% in terms of ranking by cost.  They are in the top 45% if 
Mauritius is excluded because of its island status. This suggests that SADC is relatively cost-
efficient in sugar production vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  Bringing this observation together with 
that of SADC being a net exporter (Table 1), suggests that there can be significant mutual benefits 
derived from cooperation when it comes to accessing foreign markets.  Such cooperation can 




take on various forms – such as using common port facilities, arranging co-shipments, sharing 
market intelligence, and having a common approach on international developments. 
The second observation is that there is no clear relationship between production costs and 
export levels.  In terms of neoclassical economic theory, low production costs would be 
associated with high export levels.  But this is not readily evident from the above table.  There is 
actually a contradiction in the case of the European Union (EU) which has the highest unit cost 
but at the same time has the second highest level of exports (virtually all of which goes to the 
world market).  There is also a contradiction where the EU has virtually the same export ratio as 
South Africa whose unit cost is almost half that of the EU. 
The following model was specified to conduct a quick non-rigorous test of the hypothesis that 
production costs influence sugar trade: 
 
 Y = a + bX + E 
 
 Where Y = Sugar trade; 
  X = Cost per ton of sugar; 
E = Error term (assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance); and 
a,b = Coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The coefficient b is expected to be positive in terms of the hypothesis posited above.  X is 
measured by cost per ton as reflected in Table 2.  Y has three alternative measures – namely, 
export ratio (as defined in Table 2), volume of exports (as reflected in Table 2) and export share 
(defined to be the exports by a given country shown in Table 2 divided by the total of exports 
shown in that table).  The results from ordinary least squares regression are summarised in Table 
3. 
Table 3: Regression Results for Y = a + bX 
Alternative   Estimate  Estimate  R-Squared 
Measure of Y   for a   for b  
Export Ratio   91,9127  -0,1388   0,2366 
    (27,0253)  (0,0587) 
Export Volume   1 384 002  564,187  0,0006 
    (2 420 930)  (5 262,756) 
Export Share   4,3939   0,0018   0,0006 
    (7,6859)  (0,0167)  
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.  
Two observations can be highlighted from the above results.  First, two of the estimates for b 
are in accordance with the hypothesis (that is, they pass the economic test).  However, in both 
cases the estimates are statistically insignificant at the 5% level (as reflected in the relatively high 
standard errors).  Second, in the two cases which pass the economic test, the R-squared is 
virtually zero – signifying that X explains virtually nothing of the variation in Y.  It can be 
concluded from these two observations that for the sample of countries shown in Table 2, sugar 
trade is not driven by sugar production costs.  By extension, it can be concluded that other 
considerations (including market distortions) account for sugar trade. 
In the case of SADC, some of the distortions are within individual countries and others are in 
the countries with which SADC would like to trade because of its comparative advantage in sugar 
production (especially the European Union and United States).  Examples of distortions within 
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SADC itself are quantitative import restrictions, high tariff walls, export licensing, subsidies and 
administrative changes in foreign exchange rates.  Outside SADC, notable distortions are 
quantitative restrictions on sugar imports and various sugar price support measures.  The latter 
types of distortions have a beneficial effect not only on the sugar industries in the developed 
countries where they obtain, but also on some of the SADC countries (under the ACP-EU Sugar 
Protocol and US tariff rate quota).  Such distortions cannot be removed overnight. 
The price structures faced by different SADC sugar industries to different degrees of impact are 
summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4: Prices Obtaining in Different Sugar Markets, February 2000 
Market     Price per ton             Index 
      (US $)            (World=100) 
EU - Sugar Protocol     530,76              424,6 
EU – Special Preferential Sugar   448,67              358,9 
US – Tariff Rate Quota      354,39              283,5 
World       125,00              100,0 
Note: EU = European Union and US = United States. 
Source: Swaziland Sugar Association. 
As can be appreciated, the highest price is obtainable from the EU under the ACP (African 
Caribbean Pacific)-EU Sugar Protocol (SP).  It is more than four times the world market price.  It is 
followed by the price obtainable from the Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) Agreement under the 
ACP-EU arrangements, which is more than three-and-half times the world market price.  Next in 
line is the price obtainable in the US from the tariff rate quota (TRQ) operated under the 
Generalized System of Preferences.  This is almost three times the world market price.  Then 
comes the domestic price which lies somewhere between the US and world market prices. 
Last in line is the price obtainable from the world market.  The latter is a residual market where 
sugar that cannot go into higher-paying markets is dumped.  The price in this dumped market is 
typically below production costs.  The higher the proportion of production sold in this market, the 
lower will be the average price per ton; other things being equal.  Clearly, as the composition of 
export markets shifts towards the world market, the average price computed from all markets will 
fall, other things being equal. 
The discussion in this section can be summarised in terms of four statements.  First, SADC is a 
net surplus sugar producer as well as net sugar exporter.  Second, the SADC sugar industries are 
of various sizes – with South Africa being very large; followed by Mauritius, Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland which are medium; and then the rest of the countries which are small.  Third, on the 
basis of unit production costs, the SADC sugar industries are in the top 55% bracket in the world.  
Whilst the currently existing distortions largely disable production costs from driving sugar trade, 
the relatively lower SADC costs present an opportunity that can be exploited in future when the 
world sugar scene changes.  Fourth, all the SADC sugar industries play strategic multifunctional 
roles in their respective economies.  Moreover, sugar is a political commodity.  It features 
prominently in national policies.  Accordingly, free trade which would cripple even the cost-
efficient is not a realistic option.  Hence the need for an agreement to regulate sugar trade within 
SADC. 





4. Components of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement 
The basic objective of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement is to enable an orderly growth of 
the sugar industries in the light of their strategic importance to their respective economies as well 
as the currently existing distortions surrounding various sugar markets.  It has two basic 
components – namely, market access and areas of cooperation. 
In principle, market access can be reciprocal or non-reciprocal.  In the former case, each of the 
SADC countries would open up their respective markets to each other on some agreed basis.  In 
the latter case, one or some countries would allow market access without requiring reciprocal 
arrangements with other SADC countries.  Currently, most of the sugar from the rest of SADC 
which does not go into preferential markets tends to flow into the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU).  There are three considerations which account for this tendency.  First, the SACU 
prices are higher than the domestic prices in the rest of SADC.  Second, SACU has a very large 
market provided by South Africa as the biggest and most advanced economy.  Third, all the 
adjacent SADC sugar producers with an exportable surplus have relatively lower production costs 
and can, therefore, readily access the SACU market. 
Very little sugar has flowed from SACU into the rest of SADC.  The South African sugar going 
into Mauritius is basically world market sugar.  It may fetch a higher than world-market price as a 
result of a premium due to lower transportation costs as compared to other world-market sugar 
suppliers.  The point is that this sugar is not going there under special preferential arrangements. 
Given the above scenario, the main challenge to deal with then is how to ensure that sugar 
flows into SACU from the rest of SADC do not create instability where net social welfare ends up 
being lower than would have been the case otherwise.  In a second-best world, a justifiable 
principle on which to base market access is relative exposure to the world market.  Generally 
speaking, the higher the exposure to the world market, the higher should be the access into the 
SACU market.  This is an equitable principle to the extent that it recognises the pain of exporting 
to the world market where prices are not only considerably lower than prices obtainable from 
preferential markets, but are typically below production costs.  It is also efficient to the extent that 
it encourages a better allocation of resources within SADC, given the multifunctional role played 
by the SADC sugar industries in their respective economies as well as the lower overall SADC 
costs vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Exposure to the world market can be proxied by net surplus production which is, in turn, 
defined to be excess of production over consumption and exports to preferential markets.  Table 
5 presents the relative exposures of SADC countries into the world market for 1998. 
The countries would then share in the SACU market on the basis of the figures in the last 
column of Table 5.  There are three points to be noted in this connection.  First, the figures in the 
last column have to be computed on an agreed basis that takes into account changes in 
economic circumstances over time.  In other words, the market access formula must be dynamic 
in nature.  Second, to facilitate forward planning, the formula should be applied to forecasts 
arrived at before the beginning of the season, say before April in each year for a season ending in 
March of the subsequent year.  It must then be adjusted on the basis of revised forecasts in the 
course of the season and finally on the basis of actual figures at the end of that season.  Third, if a 
country does not take up its share in any given year, that portion should be re-allocated among 
the rest of the member countries who are able and willing to supply.  A shortfall cannot be 
banked, as this would be both inequitable and inefficient.  It would be inequitable to the extent 
that it prevents other capable producers to supply the sugar and it places a burden on consumers 
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as prices rise because of lower supply.  It is inefficient to the extent that it promotes a 
misallocation of resources within the different countries (particularly the prevention of additional 
resources being devoted to sugar production).  All these points have been accommodated in the 
market access component of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement. 
Table 5: Exposure of SADC Countries to the World Market, 1998 
Country   Exports to  Net Surplus  Relative 
    Preferential  Production  Exposure 
    Markets  
    (Tons)    (Tons)      (%) 
Angola       0    0       0 
Malawi              50 000               0       0 
Mauritius      632 738               0       0 
Mozambique        19 821               0       0 
South Africa        40 244  1 577 842   76,8 
Swaziland      186 000     323 546   15,8 
Tanzania        12 000                0       0 
Zambia            12 828       94 507     4,6 
Zimbabwe      193 000       58 000     2,8 
Total    1 146 631  2 053 895  100,0 
Sources: Table 1 and Sugar Yearbook 1998 published by the International Sugar Organisation, London. 
There are two additional dimensions of market access which are noteworthy.  One is that the 
currently existing bilateral arrangements on sugar between Zimbabwe on the one hand and 
Botswana-Namibia on the other hand have been incorporated into the SADC Sugar Cooperation 
Agreement.  This is a pragmatic solution.  The other dimension is compatibility with trading rules 
and disciplines under the WTO.  This is assured by specifying a period over which the agreement 
will exist.  This period will largely depend on a review to be conducted after five years.  If world 
market conditions are sufficiently liberalised, then the Agreement will cease to exist.  There is also 
the possibility that the review may result in reciprocal market access arrangements so as to be 
fully WTO compatible. 
It should be appreciated that the Agreement is a stepping-stone towards incorporating the 
SADC sugar industries into the global trading system.  Being largely underdeveloped, the SADC 
region needs a period over which it will strengthen itself for competing effectively in the global 
trading arena.  As pointed out earlier, gradual liberalisation is better than a big bang approach.  
Hence the need for a reasonably long period to enable adjustment. 
There is a view to the effect that those SADC countries who are cost-efficient and can out-
compete South Africa should be able to sell their sugar freely into the South African market.  
Those who argue that sugar is one of the commodities through which trade imbalances with 
South Africa can be redressed often push this view.  Whilst it is true that South Africa has 
historically enjoyed a huge favourable balance of trade with all the sugar producing SADC 
countries, it is difficult to use sugar as the major means of redressing this imbalance.  The reasons 
have already been alluded above (namely, the strategic multifunctional role of the sugar industry 
and the political considerations surrounding sugar).  As pointed out in Section 2, terms of trade 
within SADC will move in favour of non-SACU SADC under the Sugar Cooperation Agreement.  
This is equitable to the extent that it results in some income transfers to the rest of SADC.  The 
difficulty is that SACU also embraces Swaziland which is not only less developed but may not be 
in a net surplus trade position vis-à-vis non-SACU SADC sugar producers.  Thus, there may be an 
inequity in the case of Swaziland.  This is an additional consideration to argue that avenues for 
redressing trade imbalances should be found mainly outside the market access component of the 
Agreement for as long as the world remains second-best. 




We now turn to the other component of the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement – namely, 
areas of cooperation.  The areas of cooperation are meant not only to complement the market 
access component, but also to promote interaction among SADC sugar industries in the spirit of 
economic integration.  Examples of these areas are sharing of training institutions, research 
facilities, sea-side export terminals, information on intra-SADC sugar flows, experiences pertaining 
to smallholder growers, transport to markets outside SADC and common approaches to 
international developments.  The SADC sugar-producing countries themselves will work out 
details on how cooperation would work in these areas.  As a matter of fact, they have already 
agreed on the terms of reference for the Working Groups that will elaborate the details of 
cooperation in specified areas. 
It is in these areas of cooperation that additional avenues can be found to improve equity and 
efficiency within SADC.  For instance, in the access of research and training facilities currently 
available in South Africa, a subsidised price can be charged to the rest of SADC sugar producers.  
The cost of sugar cane varieties developed in South Africa and made available to the rest of 
SADC can be subsidized.  Technical assistance for smallholder growers can be provided to the 
less developed areas of SADC.  All these are examples of avenues for raising the capacity of the 
less developed sugar producers in SADC so as to bring more equity and efficiency in the trading 
relations.  The “subsidies” can come from funds generated from both within and outside SADC. 
In summary then, we could say that the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement has been 
designed in the context of the second-best world in which sugar industries find themselves.  This 
Agreement takes into explicit recognition the strategic and multifunctional roles played by SADC 
sugar industries in their respective economies.  It would be myopic to engage in destructive 
competitiveness notwithstanding glaring trade imbalances among the different SADC countries.  
Other avenues should be found to redress the trade imbalances.  The Agreement has two basic 
components – namely, market access and areas of cooperation.  Whilst initially the market access 
will be offered by SACU on a non-reciprocal basis, eventually it must be reciprocal in nature to be 
WTO compatible.  It is based predominantly on exposure to the world market.  The areas of 
cooperation are meant not only to complement market access, but also to promote regional 
interaction for mutual benefit. 
5. Consolidated List of Key Issues  
The previous sections have alluded, both directly and indirectly, to various key issues facing the 
SADC sugar industries.  This section brings them together for purposes of focusing ideas.  The 
issues revolve around the central theme of long-term survival for the SADC sugar industries in the 
light of their comparative cost advantages on the one hand and distorted global sugar markets on 
the other hand.  Some of the issues are largely under the control of national industries and/or 
governments whilst others can be best handled through cooperation at the regional level. 
Issues emerging from the distortions of sugar markets which can be handled at the national 
level are as follows: 
• Efficiency of Operations: Efforts should be continuously exerted to improve operational 
efficiencies at both field and factory levels.  This entails ongoing training and upgrading of 
labour skills, installation of better equipment and generally adopting new technologies as well 
as new techniques. 
• Environmental Awareness: This derives its importance from the need to internalise all 
externalities so that the financial viability of the sugar industry truly reflects net social returns.  
 13
13 
It is only under such conditions that the allocation of resources can be said to be efficient and 
that the inter-generational distribution of net social benefits is equitable.  Moreover, the 
demonstration of environmental friendliness of a sugar industry becomes a marketing tool.  In 
the case of existing projects, there is need to undertake environmental audits to check 
whether all externalities are adequately accounted for.  In the case of new projects, 
environmental impact assessments must be conducted routinely and effectively. 
• Value Addition: Raw sugar is a primary commodity.  If exported as is, there is a loss of 
potential domestic income and employment.  This potential loss can be minimised via more 
value-added activities that use sugar as one of the major inputs.  Furthermore, value-added 
products have relatively high-income elasticities of demand.  This means that as a country 
moves into a higher stage of development (reflected especially in higher per capita incomes), 
there will be an increase in the domestic demand for the value added products.  Thus, there 
will be a self-reinforcing effect resulting in a spiral of higher sugar production and higher value 
addition on the sugar. 
• Domestic Support Measures: It was demonstrated in Section 2 that in a distorted world there 
is a case for fiscal transfers from the rest of the economy to the “controlled sector”.  This 
provides the rationale for the support of the sugar industry by a national government.  The 
support can come in various forms – including, improvement of economic infrastructure 
(roads, bridges, etc); giving tax credits to the sugar industry for the provision of social services 
(education, health care, housing, water and recreation) which would normally fall under the 
purview of the public sector; and provision of limited subsidised credit to smallholder 
growers.  Whilst domestic support measures in general are against the spirit of the multilateral 
trading system, they are permissible under WTO rules in the context of special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. 
• Internal Terms of Trade: From improved domestic terms of trade in favour of the sugar 
sector, government’s ability to provide a better enabling environment for higher investment, 
production, employment and incomes will be enhanced. 
• Private Enterprise System: The sugar industries in SADC have prospered largely because of 
their private enterprise nature.  Under such conditions, there is a higher and faster response 
rate to price signals as well as to incentives or disincentives.  Government should restrict itself 
to the active provision of an enabling environment for the private enterprise system to 
operate efficiently. 
Issues emerging from the distortions of sugar markets which can be handled at the SADC or 
regional level are as follows: 
• Market Access Within SADC: In terms of the current SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement, 
market access is non-reciprocal.  Non-SACU SADC countries can sell specified quantities of 
sugar into SACU without similar access being granted to SACU countries into the rest of 
SADC.  This is considered to be a medium-term arrangement with the long-term objective 
being reciprocal access.  That will not only improve the regional allocation of resources, but 
will also improve the regional distribution of benefits in as far as the sugar sector is 
concerned. 
• External Terms of Trade: For SADC vis-à-vis the rest of the world, terms of trade will be 
improved under the Sugar Cooperation Agreement.  This represents an opportunity for the 
SADC sugar producers to raise their respective stages of development.  Within SADC, there 
will be a differential impact.  Terms of trade for SACU will deteriorate whilst those for non-
SACU SADC will improve. 




• Access into Foreign Markets: Because SADC as a whole is a net producer and net exporter 
of sugar, there is a potential for cooperation in accessing foreign world markets.  This is 
especially the case where individual countries may not have large enough quantities of sugar 
to enjoy economies of scale in transporting and storing the sugar at the right places and at 
the right time.  Cooperation at the regional level can enable the exploitation of such 
economies. 
• EU Sugar Regime: Due to GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) commitments and 
continuous pressures under the multilateral trading system, there are reforms expected to 
take place in the EU Sugar Regime.  Some of these reforms will result in a reduction of 
domestic EU sugar prices, reduction of import quotas from the ACP (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific) countries and reduction of export subsidies (resulting in the reduction of EU exports 
to the world market).  These changes will have differential impacts on the SADC surplus sugar 
producers.  Those SADC countries currently benefiting from the protected EU markets (under 
the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol and ACP-EU Special Preferential Sugar Agreement) will be 
adversely affected by the reduction in the EU domestic sugar prices and import quotas.  This 
adverse impact will be offset to some extent by an increase in the world market price 
expected from a reduction of EU exports.  But the latter benefit may not materialise if large 
low-cost sugar producers such as Brazil, Australia and Cuba increase their exports.  There is a 
need to study these possible effects using a general-equilibrium type of model.  There needs 
to be consensus at the SADC level on how to approach the issue of the reduction of 
preferential market access.  This is especially important in the context of the negotiations that 
are expected to take place in a few years time on the EU-SADC alternative trade 
arrangements to take place after year 2008 when the current Coutonou Agreement signed in 
June 2000 between the EU and ACP countries comes to an end. 
• US Sugar Programme:  As in the case of the EU Sugar Regime, the US Sugar Programme is 
under pressure for reform.  If the reform comes in the form of a reduction in the domestic 
price of sugar without a concomitant increase in the world market sugar price, then the 
SADC countries enjoying tariff-free access under the Generalised System of Preferences will 
be adversely affected.  The degree of impact will depend on the proportionate sugar 
quantities involved.  There is a need to study these possible effects using a general-
equilibrium type of model. 
• WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Negotiations on the further reform of trade in agriculture 
(under which sugar falls) have been going on since January 2000 under Article 20 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994.  These 
negotiations have been taking place in special sessions of the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture.  Negotiating proposals as well as technical background papers prepared by the 
WTO Secretariat will be tabled until March 2001 when there will be stocktaking.  Thereafter, 
detailed negotiations will ensue.  The problem with most of the SADC countries is that, with 
the exception of South Africa and Mauritius, they individually possess inadequate manpower 
and financial resources to participate meaningfully in these negotiations.  Yet if they were to 
pool their resources, then they can have an impact.  The potential for this cooperation was 
demonstrated in Seattle, USA, in November/December 1999 when the SADC countries 
followed the otherwise disorganised sessions through regular meetings among themselves to 
brief each other and agree on the next move.  The SADC countries will not always see eye-to-
eye on all issues being discussed.  Where this is the case, a long-term view may yield some 
points of agreement and cooperation.  For instance, if the ultimate objective is the same, 
there may be an agreement not to oppose each other on short-term tactics to be pursued by 
the different countries.  Furthermore, there may be agreement on the kind of tradeoffs to be 
pursued by different countries.  The point is that discussion at the SADC level has the 
potential of producing higher benefits for the region than non-cooperation. 
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• EU-SA Free Trade Area Agreement: This agreement has implications for South Africa’s 
neighbours.  This is the case within SACU because once EU products come into South Africa, 
they can move freely.  It will also be the case for those products that will move relatively 
freely under the SADC Trade Protocol.  Of immediate concern to the sugar industry is the 
importation of EU products enjoying the export refunds.  Under this system, the EU 
manufacturer essentially buys the sugar at world prices.  Given the fact that prices within 
SADC are higher than world prices, a manufacturer of a similar product based in SADC 
would be placed at a cost disadvantage.  This adverse effect can be dealt with at the SADC 
or SACU levels.  Solutions can be in the form of compensation (fiscal transfers, technical 
assistance, restructuring of industries, re-training of labour, etc) or basing the export refund 
system on the average SACU/SADC sugar price rather than the world market price. 
• General Cooperation at International Forums: Because of shortage of national resources, it 
becomes important to pool them for effective participation in the international arena.  
Additional international forums to those already mentioned above where SADC can derive 
mutual benefit for the individual countries are the International Sugar Organisation and 
World Sugar Research Organisation. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to highlight the major issues facing sugar industries in SADC.  This 
was done within a framework that recognises the existence of distortions in global sugar markets.  
We now wish to summarise the major issues emerging from the analysis conducted in this paper. 
First, because of the existing distortions facing the different sugar industries in SADC and further 
afield as well as the strategic multifunctional role played by the sugar industries in their respective 
economies, there is a strong case for special sugar trading arrangements.  These are encapsulated 
in the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement.  Until distortions in the major sugar markets around 
the world are removed (or at least substantially reduced), it would not be in the long-term 
interests of the SADC sugar industries to engage in free sugar trade. 
Second, SADC is a net surplus sugar producer and net sugar exporter.  Coupled with the fact 
that the SADC sugar industries are relatively cost-efficient, this means that there can be mutual 
benefits generated from cooperation in accessing foreign markets.  The exact nature of the 
cooperation will be a subject of discussion among the sugar producing countries themselves. 
Third, the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement has two basic components – namely, market 
access and areas of cooperation.  The access of each other’s markets in SADC will be governed 
by special rules (given that free sugar trade is currently not a feasible option).  A fundamental 
principle underlying such rules is exposure to the world market.  The higher such exposure is, the 
higher is market access within SADC.  This is both equitable and efficient.  The areas of 
cooperation are meant not only to complement market access, but also to strengthen the spirit of 
togetherness in SADC. 
Fourth, issues which can be handled at the national level include efficiency of operations, 
environmental awareness, value addition, domestic support measures, internal terms of trade and 
private enterprise system.  Issues which can be handled at the SADC/regional level include 
market access within SADC, external terms of trade, access into foreign markets, EU sugar 
regime, US sugar programme, WTO agriculture negotiations, EU-SA free trade area agreement 
and general cooperation at international forums. 
